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FAIR TREATMENT FOR EXERIENCED PILOTS ACT-ALL
GOOD THINGS REALLY DO COME TO AN END!
JEFF ORKIN*
TMAGINE WALKING into a casino to play one of the hottest
.poker games of the last few years: High Stakes No-Limit Texas
Holdem. Prior to beginning the game, all players are informed
of the rules, including the minimum and maximum buy-ins, the
betting limits, and the ranking of poker hands to determine the
winning hand for each deal. All nine players agree on the rules
of the game. After a few hours of play, you have increased your
starting stack by several hundred thousand dollars. Only one
other player at the table has more money than you do, which is
important to know because in no-limit poker games a player can
only go broke on a particular hand if his opponent has more
money than he does. You look down at your cards and see the
Ace and King of Spades, a powerful starting hand in no-limit
holdem. The action ensues and the flop brings the Ten, Jack,
and Queen of Spades. You have just made a royal flush, the best
possible hand in no-limit holdem. At this point, you are doing
everything possible to get your opponent, the one with more
money than you, to put all of his money into the pot. You have
the nuts, a poker term for an unbeatable hand. Fortunately,
your "big stacked" opponent puts all of his money into the pot.
You cannot possibly be more excited because you are about to
"double up," and you will have more than one million dollars
coming your way. You excitedly show the table your royal flush,
but just as you start to mentally count your money, the dealer
does a disturbing thing-he starts pushing the pot towards your
opponent. Agitated, you ask the dealer why he is giving your
opponent your money. The dealer says to you, "I'm sorry, sir.
Didn't you know that we changed the rules in the middle of the
* J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, 2008; B.S.,
Aviation Management/Flight Option, Florida Tech, 1997. The author is a
commercial airline pilot who actively flew for American Airlines between 1999
and 2005.
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game? We are currently playing Razz." Razz is a poker game in
which the best low hand, not high hand, wins the pot. Poof, just
like that your millions are gone!
On December 13, 2007, the U.S. Congress and President
Bush enacted the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act',
which changed the mandatory retirement age for commercial
airline pilots from age sixty to age sixty-five. 2 This comment will
demonstrate why this Act is ill-conceived and poorly imple-
mented. The comment consists of several sections. The first
section outlines the history of the so-called "Age Sixty Rule."3
The second section evaluates the provisions of the Fair Treat-
ment for Experienced Pilots Act and its implications for current
airline pilots. The third section discusses possible reasons that,
after close to fifty years, the mandatory retirement age was fi-
nally amended. Finally, an alternative implementation plan is
discussed that would be a more balanced approach to this divi-
sive issue for all airline pilots, notjust the current cadre of pilots
at the top of their respective airlines' seniority lists.
I. HISTORY OF THE AGE SIXTY RULE
The age sixty mandatory retirement rule was enacted in
1959.' There was no mandatory retirement age prior to 1959. 5
The Federal Aviation Administration's ("FAA") initial justifica-
tion for enacting the Age Sixty Rule was concern about the
safety of air travel.6 The mission of the FAA is "to provide the
safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world."7 The pol-
icy rationale for the Age Sixty Rule was "to preserve safety while
being as fair as possible to pilots' interests."8 Richard Reinhart,
an aviation medical examiner, has stated that in trying to define
a "truly safe pilot from a medical point of view," age, and aging
I Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act of 2007, 49 U.S.C.A. § 44729
(West Supp. 2008).
2 Id.
3 Beatrice Kathleen Barklow, Comment, Rethinking the Age Sixty Mandatory Re-
tirement Rule: A Look at the Newest Movement, 60J. AIR L. & COM. 329, 331 (1994).
4 Airline Pilots Against Age Discrimination, History of Age 60 Rule, http://
www.apaad.org/history.htm [hereinafter APAAD] (last visited July 28, 2008).
5 Id.
6 See Lester Reingold, Laying Siege to 'Age 60'" Professional Pilots Federation Lobby-
ing to Allow Pilots Over Age 60 to Fly Commercial Routes, AIR TRANSP. WORLD, June
1993, at 184, available at 1993 WLNR 3568979.
7 Federal Aviation Administration, Mission, http://www.faa.gov/about/mis-
sion/ (last visited July 28, 2008).
8 Reingold, supra note 6, at 184.
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in general, are factors, but a specific age is not necessarily a fac-
tor.' However, until a reliable process exists to accurately assess
a particular pilot's competency, a uniform retirement age is
imposed."
The FAA also supported the Age Sixty Rule because of a study
that found that heart attacks and strokes, unable to be detected
by the medical technology available when the rule was passed,
were more frequent in men approaching sixty.1 The study
found that "[a] ging causes deterioration of important physical
and mental processes related to degenerative arteriosclerosis
(hardening of the arteries);" individuals age differently, thus
predicting the effects of aging is impossible; age-related degen-
eration accelerates in the later stages of life, and sudden inca-
pacitation results from aging. 2 Based on these factors, the FAA
has maintained a position that "the risks of incapacitation and
error could not be entirely screened out" and therefore, the age
restriction cannot be eliminated without some degradation in
the level of safety.'3
Interestingly, while no pilot has ever been granted a waiver
from the Age Sixty Rule, the FAA has granted medical waivers
for many pilots for a variety of medical issues including heart
conditions and alcohol abuse.' 4 The FAA has defended these
actions by differentiating between pilots with known, specific
medical issues and older pilots in general. 5 The FAA has stated
that those pilots "with specific health problems can be identi-
fied, tested, and monitored to prevent a compromise of
safety.' 16
The FAA continued its support for the Age Sixty Rule because
many airlines preferred that the rule remain in effect. 7 Many
9 Id.
10 Id.
I I Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
12 Barklow, supra note 3, at 333.
13 Id. at 333-34.
14 Steven Morris, Grounded at 60: Pilots Cite Experience in Renewing Fight Against
FAA Retirement, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1992, (Transportation), at 1, available at 1992
WLNR 4119521.
15 Barklow, supra note 3, at 334.
16 Id.
17 Federal Aviation Administration's Age 60 Rule: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 3
(2005) (statement by Airline Division, International Brotherhood of Teamsters),
available at http://vvw.age60rule.com/docs/IBT_Submission-to ARCPanel.
pdf.
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airlines feared that a change in the rule could "disrupt pension
plans, flight schedules, training costs and healthcare plans."'"
For example, Robert Baker, executive vice president of Ameri-
can Airlines, stated in 1993, that "extension of the retirement
age would result in 'significant' costs for the carrier due to the
way its pension plans are structured."' 9
However, not all people believe that the FAA had as noble a
goal in mind in enacting the Age Sixty Rule as aviation safety.
Some people believe the rule was enacted as a political favor by
General Elwood R. Quesada, administrator of the FAA in 1959,
to benefit C.R. Smith, then chairman of American Airlines and a
personal friend of General Quesada.2 ° It was during this time
period that the first-generation jet aircraft were delivered to the
airlines.21
Traditionally, airline pilots bid for monthly flying assignments
and status positions (equipment, domicile, seat position) based
on their seniority with the company.22 Historically, the senior
pilots at an airline opt to fly the largest airplanes that the com-
pany operates because the largest aircraft offer the most pay per
flight hour.23 C.R. Smith did not want to absorb the significant
training costs for pilots that would only operate the new jets for
a short period of time prior to their retirements. 24 Therefore, in
an effort to force his pilots to retire at age sixty, he compiled
some statistics from the American Airlines Boeing 707 training
classes that tended to show that his oldest pilots required the
most training and had the most difficulty passing the certifica-
tion exams, and sent that information to his friend, General
Quesada, in an effort to persuade the FAA to enact a mandatory
retirement age of sixty years.25 Notably, the new mandatory re-
tirement rule was promulgated only months after Smith made
1s Robin Sidel, U.S. Pilot Retirement Rule Faces Renewed Scrutiny, REUTERS NEWS,
Sept. 13, 1993, at 1.
19 Id.
20 See APAAD, supra note 4.
21 Id.
22 Telephone Interview with Noam Alon, United Airlines Pilot (Jan. 20, 2008)
[hereinafter Alon Interview].
23 See, e.g., Airline Pilot Central, http://airlinepilotcentral.com/airlines/leg-
acy/american.html.
24 See Sidel, supra note 18, at 1 (quoting Delta Airlines spokesman Neil
Monroe, "Training is one of the most expensive parts of pilot costs."); see also
Letter from C.R. Smith to Gen. Elwood Quesada (Apr. 30, 1959), available at
http://wvw.age6Orule.com/docs/smith-qiesada.pdf.
25 Letter from C.R. Smith to Gen. Elwood Quesada, supra note 24.
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his pleas to Quesada. 26 The rule was enacted despite the fact
that only one year prior to its enactment, a Flight Safety Founda-
tion report, specifically considering the impact of the new jet
aircraft, "specifically recommended no change[s] to the [then
current] pilot medical certification standards. 27
A. CRITICISM AND COURT CHALLENGES TO
THE AGE SixTY RULE
Critics of the Age Sixty Rule have existed since the rule's in-
ception. The biggest complaint that critics leveled against the
rule is that the age limit is arbitrary.28 Many critics of the rule
claimed that the selection of a particular age was "based on
'armchair guesswork and stereotyped thinking about the begin-
ning of old age,' not 'chosen on the basis of scientific medical
studies.' "29
1. Early Court Challenge to the Age Sixty Rule
Nonetheless, all court challenges to the Age Sixty Rule have
failed.3" In Quesada, the plaintiffs, consisting of thirty-five indi-
vidual pilots, the pilots' union, and the union president,
brought suit for a declaratory judgment that the recently en-
acted mandatory age sixty retirement regulation was null and
void "because it was issued without the holding of adjudicatory
hearings required by the Administrative Procedure Act. '31 The
plaintiffs also claimed that "the regulation, by terminating their
right to pilot planes in commercial service after age sixty, de-
prive[d] them of property in their pilots' licenses without due
process of law."'32 The district court denied the plaintiffs' mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction and the plaintiffs appealed.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 34 The
court stated that the Federal Aviation Act vested power in the
administrator of the FAA to promote the safety of flight by pre-
26 APAAD, supra note 4.
27 Id.
28 Barklow, supra note 3, at 338; Don Phillips, Study Has Good and Bad News For
Airline Pilots Over 60, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1990, at A2.
29 Barklow, supra note 3, at 338.
30 See, e.g., Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1990); Aman v. FAA, 856
F.2d 946, 957 (7th Cir. 1988); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l vs. Quesada, 276 F.2d
892, 898 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
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scribing reasonable rules restricting "the maximum hours or pe-
riods of service of airmen" and other reasonable rules the
"Administrator may find necessary to provide adequately for na-
tional security and safety in air commerce.
''11
2. More Recent Court Challenges to the Age Sixty Rule: Aman and
Baker
The petitioners in Aman were twenty-eight pilots employed as
captains or flight engineers by major airlines. 6 The petitioners
had appealed to the FAA for exemptions from the mandatory
age sixty retirement rule and the FAA denied the exemptions. 7
The court divided the petitioners' claims in to two main argu-
ments. 3  The court explained the petitioners' first claim as be-
ing that pilots over age sixty that meet the psychological and
medical standards as outlined in the protocol, as well as any ad-
ditional medical or operational testing standards required by
the airlines or the FAA, "are no more likely to cause accidents
due to sudden incapacitation or undetected deterioration of pi-
loting skills than are pilots below the age of sixty."3 9 The court
required the plaintiffs to demonstrate "that the FAA lacked sub-
stantial evidence for a finding that strict enforcement of the
[A]ge [S]ixty [R]ule reduces age-related risks of incapacitation
and undetected deterioration of piloting skills."4"
The FAA found "that granting individualized exemptions
under the petitioners' standards would not ensure the level of
safety achieved by uniform enforcement of the [A]ge [S]ixty
[R]ule and therefore denied the requested exemptions.4 It
concluded that the petitioners' proposed health protocol, even
when coupled with additional screening, "cannot entirely screen
35 Id. at 895.
36 Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1988).
37 Id. The exemption petitions "relied heavily on the recommendations of a
six-member 'Age 60 Exemption Panel." Id. The panel was comprised of five
physicians and a psychologist. Id. Their qualifications were in the fields of cardi-
ology, aerospace medicine, and neuro-psychology. Id. The panel devised a "bat-
tery of... tests as a basic protocol for assessing the fitness of pilots over the age of
sixty." Id. The panel stated that "this protocol, if properly administered and sup-
plemented, where appropriate, by additional medical ...and ...operational
tests ... provided an adequate basis for exempting some older pilots from the
[mandatory retirement] rule." Id.
38 Id. at 952.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 949.
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out the increased risks of incapacitation and error due to the
deterioration of skills that comes with age. '4 2 The FAA further
stated that "because the likelihood of sudden death, disability,
or incapacitation due to previously undetected disease increases
at an accelerating rate with each additional year of chronologi-
cal age, granting exemptions would compromise, by some
amount, the current level of safety."4 ' The court ultimately re-
manded to the agency (on the second claim) but it stated that
the FAA did have substantial evidence in the record on which to
base its decision.44 The court stated, "[w]hen the question is
whether the petitioners' protocol eliminates all of the incremen-
tal risk associated with sudden incapacitation or undetected de-
terioration of skills among pilots over sixty, a substantial body of
medical opinion continues to 'doubt the feasibility' of the
project. 45
The court was not as amenable to the FAA's position as to
petitioners' second claim. The court explained the petitioners'
second claim as follows: "exemption [s] must be granted because
older pilots who satisfy the protocol and existing operational
[and medical testing standards] are safer than the average pilot
because performance improves with experience. '46 The FAA re-
jected this contention by stating that the petitioners failed to
show that their request is in the public interest. 47 The FAA did
not agree that it was in the best interest of the public to presume
an increase in safety would result from using the services of pi-
lots over age sixty. 48 The court stated that "the FAA fail[ed] to
present findings of fact supported by substantial evidence ... to
justify its offhand dismissal" of the claim that experience en-
hances safety.4 9 Since the FAA failed to justify its denial based
on substantial evidence in the record, the court remanded to
the FAA for an explanation concerning the deficiency.5 °
42 Id. at 952.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 957.
45 Id. at 954 (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 952.
47 Id. at 955.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 957.
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3. Baker v. FAA
After the remand in Aman, the FAA again refused to grant
exemptions to pilots seeking to continue to fly in commercial
airline operations past age sixty.5 The court, on remand, stated
that both parties relied on "flawed evidence" and ultimately af-
firmed the FAA's denial of exemptions.52
The petitioners relied on "anecdotal evidence of superannu-
ated pilots performing heroic deeds. '53 One showing demon-
strated the superior airmanship of United Airlines Captain
David Cronin. 54 At fifty-nine years of age, and on his penulti-
mate commercial flight for United Airlines, Captain Cronin suc-
cessfully landed his Boeing 747 after a cargo door blew open
seventeen minutes after takeoff from Honolulu, Hawaii.5 5 Cap-
tain Cronin and crew consulted the emergency procedures
checklist, but based on his experience, he determined that, con-
sidering the nature of the multiple emergencies he faced, fol-
lowing the emergency procedures in the flight manual would
cause his aircraft to lose too much altitude.56 Instead, Captain
Cronin saved the lives of those on board the doomedjetliner by
manually operating the controls while constantly readjusting
speed and altitude. 57 The court discounted this anecdotal evi-
dence because the case before the court did not involve pilots
who performed "aeronautical miracles. ' 58 Thus, the court con-
cluded it did not need to "consider the arguable entitlement of
51 Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 318, 319 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936
(1991).
52 Id. at 323.
53 Id. at 319.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 320.
57 Id. Incidentally, another senior (age 57), United Airlines Captain, Al
Haynes, performed heroically on July 19, 1989. Chris Kilroy, Special Report:
United Airlines Flight 232, AirDisaster.com, http://www.airdisaster.com/special/
special-ua232.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). United Airlines Flight 232 suffered
a catastrophic failure of the number two engine. Id. The explosion caused the
loss of all of the hydraulic systems on the aircraft, which resulted in the aircraft
being almost completely uncontrollable. Id. The aircraft was only controllable
by manipulating engine power on the two wing-mounted engines. Id. Amaz-
ingly, the crew manipulated the crippled aircraft to the Sioux City Gateway Air-
port, and managed to touch down on one of the airport runways. Id. Though
111 people perished in the crash, the heroic efforts of Captain Haynes and crew
saved 185 lives. Id. In simulator trials recreating the accident scenario, other
qualified DC-10 crews were unable to nurse the crippled aircraft to the airport.
Id.
58 Baker, 917 F.2d at 320.
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such 'special' pilots to exemptions from the [A]ge [S]ixty
[R] ule. ' 59
The court was likewise dissatisfied with the statistical record
the petitioners presented.6" The statistics relied on records
from the National Transportation Safety Board showing "that pi-
lots age sixty and older had a lower accident rate per 1,000 pilots
than pilots in other age groups."6' The court noted that the
statistics in the report "failed to account for exposure to risk in
terms of hours of flight time. 62 Thus, pilots who flew infre-
quently, and therefore incurred a reduced risk of accident, car-
ried the same weight as pilots who flew regularly with the greater
accident risks.6" The court also noted that the petitioners
presented evidence that allowing pilots over age sixty to con-
tinue to fly would increase, on average, crew experience, but
they failed to show that lack of crew experience was a problem
that needed correcting.6 4
Though the court was not particularly enthralled with the pe-
titioners' evidence, it does not mean that the court was pleased
with the evidence the FAA relied on to deny the exemption peti-
tions-age-categorized accident experience reports known as
the Flight Time Study.65 The study showed a higher accident
rate for those over sixty, but the court noted that the major flaw
in the study was that the under-sixty grouping included the mil-
lions of miles of accident-free airline flight time, while the over-
sixty grouping only included general aviation miles and hours
flown (because there were no over-sixty airline hours to in-
clude) .66 Thus, the court concluded that the under-age sixty ac-
cident rate was significantly understated and the over-age sixty
accident rate was overstated.67
Another flaw the court noted was the grouping of pilots in
ten-year age brackets. 68 The court noted that, presumably, more
exemptions to the Age Sixty Rule would be granted to pilots in









67 Id. at 321.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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cluded that "the cumulation of accidents caused by pilots in
their late sixties with accidents caused by pilots in their early
sixties may as a practical matter tend to skew the Study."7
Nonetheless, the court determined that "it was the petition-
ers' burden to present persuasive evidence that granting exemp-
tions would not impair [aviation] safety. ' '71  The court
recognized that it was not presented with compelling evidence
that would indicate that exemptions would impair safety, but
likewise, it was not presented with strong evidence that the expe-
rience of the over-sixty crowd "clearly overbears the danger of
deterioration of piloting skills (or of sudden incapacitation) as-
sociated with the aging process. '72 The court further noted that
it would seek such a showing where crucial issues of public safety
are at stake. 73 Absent any compelling evidence, the court de-
ferred to the decisions of the expert agency."
The opinions in Aman and Baker summarize the positions of
all the parties involved in the controversy. Pilots seeking exemp-
tions need to provide compelling evidence that exemptions do
not impair safety. The FAA needs to base its decisions on sub-
stantial evidence in the record. The courts, in the absence of
sufficiently compelling evidence to the contrary, defer to the
FAA, the agency in charge of carrying out the mission of the
Federal Aviation Act.
The Baker court did note, at the close of its opinion, that the
FAA should not take from the decision of the case "that the
[A]ge [S]ixty [R]ule is sacrosanct and untouchable. 75  The
court noted that the FAA must give serious attention to the
growing body of opinion that the time had come to repeal the
longstanding rule.76
Though the court admonished the FAA to seriously consider
changing the rule, the rule remained in place for another seven-
teen years. It was not until December 13, 2007, that the rule was
changed.77 Moreover, it took an act of Congress, as opposed to
70 Id.





76 Id. at 323.
77 Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act of 2007, 49 U.S.C.A. § 44729
(West Supp. 2008).
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a decision of the agency tasked with promoting and maintaining
air safety, to amend the Age Sixty Rule.78
B. SUPREME COURT CHALLENGE
Aman and Baker were both argued in the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. However, the Age Sixty Rule has been chal-
lenged at all levels, including the U.S. Supreme Court.7 9 In Cris-
well, two airline captains sued the airline when the company
denied their request to downgrade from captain to flight engi-
neer as they each approached their sixtieth birthday." The pi-
lots sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"). 1 The ADEA generally prohibits mandatory retire-
ment prior to age seventy, but the ADEA does provide an excep-
tion "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
[BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business. '8 2 The mandatory age sixty retirement rule
applied to pilots, but the rule was not applicable to flight engi-
neers.83 However, Western Air Lines did require all of its flight
deck employees to retire at age sixty, ostensibly because age sixty
was the retirement age defined in the company's retirement
plan .84
The district court found that since a flight engineer's duties
are not critical to the safety of flight, except in emergency situa-
tions, there was no merit to Western's argument that a
mandatory age sixty retirement for flight engineers was a
BFOQ. 5 The Supreme Court evaluated the BFOQ question by
using the test set forth by the Fifth Circuit. 6 The Court noted
that "[t] he job qualifications which the employer invokes to jus-
tify his discrimination must be reasonably necessary to the essence
of his business. 81 7 To comply with this requirement, an em-
ployer could establish that "it had reasonable cause to believe,
that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
[persons over the age qualifications] would be unable to per-
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
80 Id. at 405.
81 Id. at 405-06. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
82 Criswell, 472 U.S. at 403.
83 Id. at 404.
84 Id. at 405.
85 Id. at 408; Criswell v. W. Air Lines, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 384, 389-91 (C.D. Cal.
1981).
86 Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235 (5th Cir. 1976).
87 Criswell, 472 U.S. at 413.
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form safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved. '8 8 Al-
ternatively, an employer could seek to "establish that age [is] a
legitimate proxy for the safety-related job qualifications by prov-
ing that it is 'impossible or highly impractical' to deal with the
older employees on an individualized basis."8 9  The Court
stated, "[o] ne method by which the employer can carry this bur-
den is to establish that some members of the discriminated-
against class possess a trait precluding safe and efficientjob per-
formance that cannot be ascertained by means other than
knowledge of the applicant's membership in the class."90 Not-
ing that other airlines were routinely operating their aircraft
with flight engineers over the age of sixty, the Court rejected
Western's contention that a mandatory age sixty retirement for
flight engineers was a BFOQ however, the mandatory age sixty
retirement was upheld as it pertained to pilots.9
II. THE DRIVE TOWARDS THE FAIR TREATMENT FOR
EXPERIENCED PILOTS ACT
On September 11, 2001, the world changed forever. The ter-
rorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
devastated the airline industry. Despite the fact that the indus-
try received a $5 billion government bailout, the industry lost a
combined $7.7 billion in 2001 and approximately $6 billion in
2002.92 Industry losses through 2004 have been estimated at
over $32 billion. 3 Thousands of pilots were furloughed from
their respective airlines and as of the date of this writing,
thousands of pilots remain on furlough.9 4 Moreover, many air-
lines, including Delta, Northwest, US Airways, and United Air-
lines have filed for bankruptcy court protection. Airlines
88 Id. at 414.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 414-15 (quoting Usery, 531 F.2d at 235).
91 Id. at 423.
92 Steve Huettel, Airlines Don't See Relief Over Horizon, ST. PETERSBURG TiMES,
Sept. 7, 2002, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/07/news-pf/911/
Airlinesdon t see re.shtml.
93 Chris Isidore, Delta, Northwest Files for Bankruptcy: Spike in jet Fuel Sparks Fil-
ings, Putting Almost Half of U.S. Airline Capacity in Chapter 11, CNN MONEY, Sept.
15, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/14/news/fortune5OO/bankruptcy-
airlines/index.htm.
94 As of January 13, 2008, 2,287 American Airlines pilots remain on furlough.
The author of this comment is one of the furloughed pilots and has access to a
current copy of the airline's pilot seniority list. The list is kept on file with the
author [hereinafter Pilot List].
95 Isidore, supra note 93.
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extracted massive pay and benefit concessions from employee
groups; American Airlines' pilots alone agreed to over $660 mil-
lion in contract concessions.9 6 United Airlines' pilots had their
defined benefit pension plans terminated.9 7 US Airways also ter-
minated its pilots' pension plans.98 When the plan was termi-
nated, the obligation was assumed by the Federal Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC").99 However, the PBGC
was only responsible for $600 million of the estimated $2.5 bil-
lion shortfall in the plan.100 Thus, a US Airways pilot who was
expecting a retirement benefit of $75,000 per year would now
expect to receive a benefit of $25,000 per year.' The dramatic
reduction in the estimated benefit is due to the PBGC's maxi-
mum-benefit rules, which are determined each year under the
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"). 1°2 To highlight, for pension plans ending in 2003,
the maximum guaranteed amount was $3,664.77 per month for
workers who retired at age sixty-five.'0 3 The guaranteed amount
is reduced if a worker retires prior to age sixty-five." 4 Thus,
since commercial pilots were forced to retire at age sixty, the
benefit amounts they were entitled to receive from the PBGC
were below the maximum PBGC limits. 10 5
The financial impact on these pilots renewed the drive to
overturn the mandatory age sixty retirement rule.10 6 Allowing
pilots to continue to fly commercially until age sixty-five would
allow them to receive the maximum benefit awards available
under PBGC guidelines.'017 Additionally, the pilots would con-
tinue to pay into the Social Security System and their own pri-
96 Eric Torbenson, Group of Pilots Accuses Union Chief of Insider Trading; APA
President Calls Splinter Organization's Claim 'Completely False, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 20, 2003, at 22A, available at 2003 WLNR 16479253.
97 Michael Schroeder, Looking to Keep Pension Agency Solvent, Congress Fears Back-
lash, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2005, at Al.









106 Geneve Dubois, Comment, The Age 60 Rule-It Is Time To Defeat It., 70J. AIR
L. & COM. 319, 322-24 (2005).
107 See Pension Pain, supra note 98.
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vate retirement accounts for an additional five years.'1 As one
pilot noted in a letter to Senator Dianne Feinstein,
We are depending on these pensions earned over more than 30
years of each of our employments with UAL to pay for our retire-
ment living ... [since] the FAA forced me to retire at age 60[,] I
was not able to delay my retirement and work any additional
years to make up for any [additional] loss of pension income.' 09
As will be discussed later in this comment, this statement is
only partially accurate, and pilots such as the one that wrote this
letter were seeking to profit off of the backs of all pilots on the
United Airlines' pilot seniority list junior to themselves.
A. THE TIDE TURNS: OPPONENTS OF THE AGE SixTiy RULE
FINALLY ACHIEVE SUCCESS
As mentioned above, it was a long fought battle to repeal the
Age Sixty Rule.' 10 Opponents of the rule finally achieved victory
on December 13, 2007.111 The opponents of the rule were able
to accomplish, via legislative direction, what they could not ac-
complish through administrative or judicial channels. Unfortu-
nately, the recently passed Act is hypocritical, short-sighted, and
contradictory, and it will damage the careers and earning poten-
tial of the majority of current commercial airline pilots.
Several provisions of the Act are deficient. This section ex-
plores those various provisions and explains why the Act is
deficient.
As mentioned above, many people have claimed that the
mandatory age sixty retirement rule had nothing to do with avia-
tion safety.112 Thus, Congress chose to amend the retirement
age to age sixty-five." 13 Yet, in the Act, Congress also chose to
adopt the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO")
standard for international commercial operations.114 If the
108 Dubois, supra note 106, at 322-23.
109 Id. at 323.
1'0 See id.
III Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act of 2007, 49 U.S.C.A. § 44729
(West Supp. 2008).
112 See APAAD, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
13 49 U.S.C.A. § 44729(a). "Subject to the limitation in subsection (c), a pilot
may serve in multicrew covered operations until attaining 65 years of age." Id.
114Id. § 44729(c). "A pilot who has attained 60 years of age may serve as pilot-
in-command in covered operations between the United States and another coun-
try only if there is another pilot in the flight deck crew who has not yet attained 60
years of age." Id. (emphasis added).
592
FAIR TREATMENT ACT
mandatory age sixty regulation was not concerned with the
safety of aircraft operations with pilots over sixty years old in
command of the aircraft, this crew-pairing restriction is superflu-
ous and unnecessary. This crew-pairing restriction indicates
that the regulators are not as convinced as they claim to be that
pilots older than sixty years of age are as safe as their under age
sixty brethren.
The fact that the crew-pairing restriction applies only to inter-
national operations highlights another strange anomaly. The
restriction in no way addresses the demands of certain types of
airline operations. For example, a flight from Miami Interna-
tional Airport to Grand Cayman is only one hour and twenty-five
minutes long,' 15 and it occurs in the generally pleasant and calm
weather of the Caribbean. Conversely, an all night flight from
Seattle to Miami is five hours and forty-five minutes in dura-
tion. 1 6 According to the Act, the captain-in-command of the
flight to Grand Cayman must be accompanied by an under sixty
co-pilot; however, the all-night flight from Seattle to Miami can
be flown by two pilots who are both over age sixty. If a pilot over
age sixty is not deemed capable of commanding an aircraft be-
tween Miami and Grand Cayman without the aid of an under
age sixty co-pilot, it is incredulous to believe that the same over
sixty captain can handle the rigors of a backside of the clock,
transcontinental flight.
More telling on the notion of safety is Section 44729(h) (3) of
the Act. It states that within twenty-four months after the Act is
enacted, a report must be filed with congressional committees
describing the effect the Act has had on aviation safety.' 1 7 The
passage of this Act unwittingly subjects all airline passengers to
the role of "test passenger" on flights with pilots over sixty years
of age. Congress should not subject the traveling public to any
decreased margins of safety in the interest of helping one small
115 American Airlines, Book Flights, http://www.aa.com (last visited Jan. 13,
2008).
116 Id.
17 49 U.S.C.A. § 44729(h) (3).
Not later than 24 months after the date of enactment of this sec-
tion, the Comptroller General shall submit to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of
the Senate a report concerning the effect, if any, on aviation safety
of the modification to pilot age standards made by subsection (a).
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group of senior airline pilots achieve a financial windfall at the
expense of all other active pilots.
I stress the word "active" because the Act also contains a "non-
retroactivity" clause.' 18 Thus, pilots who had the unfortunate
experience of reaching their sixtieth birthday on or before De-
cember 12, 2007, do not enjoy the protections of the Act.'19 In
order to continue flying for their particular air carrier, they
need to be "rehired" and start at the bottom of the seniority list.
Talk about arbitrary. One of the major criticisms of the old rule
was that it arbitrarily ended the careers of commercial airline
pilots. 12 ° This provision, restricting the ability of a pilot to con-
tinue to fly if he or she celebrated his or her sixtieth birthday on
or before December 12, 2007, while allowing the pilot whose
birthday falls on or after December 13, 2007, another five years
in the cockpit, is completely arbitrary. It is probably more arbi-
trary than the old rule itself. At least the old rule affected all
current pilots equally because all pilots currently flying at the
airlines were hired when the old regulation was in effect. How-
ever, in deference to Congress, this provision was probably a
necessary concession to the airlines. Conceivably, it would be a
significant administrative burden to "rehire" any pilot that has
retired within the past five years. Plus, the Act as written seeks to
protect airlines from the inevitable lawsuits that will be filed by
pilots that were forced to retire because they turned sixty on or
before December 12, 2007.121 This section of the Act is quite
118 Id. § 44729(e)(1).
No person who has attained 60 years of age before the date of en-
actment of this section may serve as a pilot for an air carrier en-
gaged in covered operations unless (A) such person is in the
employment of that air carrier in such operations on such date of
enactment as a required flight deck crew member; or (B) such per-
son is newly hired by an air carrier as a pilot on or after such date of
enactment without credit for prior seniority or prior longevity for
benefits or other terms related to length of service prior to the date




120 Barklow, supra note 3, at 338; Phillips, supra note 28.
12, 49 U.S.C.A. § 44729(e) (2).
An action taken in conformance with this section, taken in con-
formance with a regulation issued to carry out this section, or taken
prior to the date of enactment of this section in conformance with
section 121.383(c) of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (as in
effect before such date of enactment), may not serve as a basis for
liability or relief in a proceeding, brought under any employment
594
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prescient, because, in fact, a group of senior (in age, not neces-
sarily in seniority) pilots dissatisfied with the Act as written, have
already declared their intent to have the Act rewritten to allow
them to return to active status. 122 Jonathan Turley, lawyer for
the Senior Pilots Coalition has stated that he will challenge the
law on a variety of grounds including challenges based on Equal
Protection, Due Process, the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Tak-
ings Clause, and interference with the right to contract. 12
Turley is specifically seeking to challenge Section 44729(e) of
the Act, which contains the "nonretroactivity" and "protection
for compliance" language.
124
B. CHANGING THE RULES IN THE MIDDLE OF THE GAME:
STEALING FROM THE MANY TO BENEFIT THE FEW
The new rules for pilot retirement will have a devastating ef-
fect on the careers of those current commercial pilots who are
not already in the highest paying positions at their respective
carriers. Airline pilots operate in a seniority-driven industry. 125
law or regulation, before any court or agency of the United States
or of any State or locality.
Id.
122 Press Release, Senior Pilots Coalition, Law Professor: Senior Pilots Coalition




The Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, recently signed
into law as Pub. L. No. 110-135, will be challenged on a variety of
grounds. Due to poor drafting and clearly unconstitutional compo-
nents, the law, signed into law on December 13, 2007, presents
something of a target-rich environment. Pilots will seek declaratory
and injunctive relief inder the Declaratory Judgment Act, 18
U.S.C. 2001 et seq. If successful, the law will be declared null and
void.
Obviously, the best outcome would be a legislative fix. This law
seems almost casual, if not conversational, in its language. Con-
gress clearly enacted this law with little understanding of its impli-
cations or inevitable litigation. If struck in this lawsuit, the Act will
cause further confusion and chaos as courts force companies to re-
verse measures implemented after its enactment. The first step,
however, is to seek judicial relief. If legislative relief comes, it




125 Alon Interview, supra note 22.
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The aircraft a pilot chooses, the domicile to which a pilot is as-
signed, the position a pilot enjoys (either captain or first of-
ficer), and the monthly flying assignments are all awarded based
on seniority.' 26 The senior-most pilot chooses what he or she
wants and the process repeats throughout the remainder of the
list until all active pilots have received an award. 127 Advance-
ment up the seniority list only occurs when those senior pilots
retire, thus creating vacancies in the system that are filled from
below. Considering that no currently active pilot was flying in
1959, when the Age Sixty Rule was enacted, every active pilot
benefited from the forced retirement of those senior to him.
Each pilot knew the rules of the game when he or she was hired.
The rules stated that no matter how smoothly one's career may
go, when you reach sixty years old, it is time to step aside and let
those that succeeded you enjoy their time in the senior-most po-
sitions with the company. All pilots had plenty of advanced
warning that they should take responsibility for their financial
security and to plan accordingly. Pilots such as the one who
wrote Senator Feinstein 128 somehow feel entitled to remain for
five extra years in the positions they have achieved precisely be-
cause of the forced retirement of those senior to them. In other
words, they wanted to have their cake and eat it, too. This Act
hands those pilots a great big slice of cake.
The junior pilots (and by junior I refer to any pilot who does
not already occupy any of the highest paying positions at an air-
line) will suffer an enormous financial impact to both their ca-
reer earnings and their retirement packages should they decide
to retire at age sixty, the age at which they expected to retire
when they were hired. Since the Act will cause another five
years of stagnation, all pilots will remain in their current bid
statuses for that period of time assuming that the airline will not
increase capacity. (For example, presently, American Airlines
does not plan to increase capacity in the near future). 129 Thus,
a pilot loses out on the immediate raise in hourly pay due to
promotion to a bigger aircraft. The pilot also loses the value of
compounding the extra money that is placed in to the current
versions of the retirement plans. For example, an American Air-
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See Dubois, supra note 106, at 323 and accompanying text.
129 Terry Maxon, Traffic, Capacity Fall on American Airlines, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 3, 2008, at ID, available at http://%v.dallasnews.com/sharedcon-
tent/dws/bus/stories/010408dnbusaatraffic.6ea4493.html.
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lines Boeing 767 captain with twelve years seniority (or more as
the pay scale tops out at twelve years) currently earns $179/
hour.130 A Boeing 777 captain with twelve years seniority (or
more) earns $205/hour.'3 1 American Airlines pilots are guaran-
teed sixty-four hours of pay per month.132 Thus, the 767 captain
who is now unable to advance to the 777 due to the new retire-
ment age loses a minimum of $20,000 per year for the next five
years. Also, a portion of the earnings are placed in the pilot's
retirement account. 133 The financial impact is even more devas-
tating when the compounded value of those lost dollars is calcu-
lated. The previous example only describes the impact to a
relatively senior 767 captain. The results are even more devas-
tating to the pilots who currently occupy the lowest paying posi-
tions in the company. The only way to recover, and in some
cases there is no way to truly recover all the money that will be
lost, is for the junior pilots to continue to fly past age sixty.
Speaking from personal experience as a furloughed American
Airlines pilot, flying beyond age sixty is not a palatable option.
Moreover, while the senior pilot continues to earn a salary for
the years between sixty and sixty-five, in a position that he knew
was not available to him when he was hired, he prolongs the
furlough of the junior members of the seniority list for another
five years.
The Act also presents another problem for the pilot corps-
scheduling. As mentioned previously, pilots bid for their
monthly schedules based on their company seniority.'34 The se-
nior pilots have the first choice of monthly trip selections and
the process repeats itself until all the scheduled trips have been
allocated to the pilots in the particular bid status (a bid status
includes the type of aircraft, domicile, seat position, and in some
cases a division qualification).'3 Monthly bidding is extremely
important because it determines the schedule that a pilot will fly
during the upcoming month.1 36 There are a multitude of fac-
tors that affect a pilot's choice of which schedule(s) to bid for
during the bid selection process. Suppose one pilot needs to be
130 Airline Pilot Central, http://airlinepilotcentral.com/airlines/legacy/amer-
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off on a particular day of the month because that day is his wed-
ding anniversary or because it is his child's birthday. That pilot
is likely to prioritize the monthly trip selections in a manner that
affords him the greatest opportunity to achieve the desired re-
sult. Other pilots select monthly assignments based on trip des-
tinations, monthly pay total (as not all lines of monthly flying
pay the same), or numbers of consecutive days without flying. It
is a pilot's seniority that determines how successful that pilot will
be in being able to secure the monthly flying assignment that he
desires. Since the Act has a crew-pairing restriction based on
the age of the captain of the flight, the Act presents the possibil-
ity of abrogating seniority (it must be kept in mind that for each
monthly flying assignment, two positions are awarded; the cap-
tain position and the first officer position must both be filled).
To highlight, suppose that the most senior 767 first officer
desires to be off on the 15th of the following month. Since he is
the most senior pilot in his bid status he always receives his first
choice of monthly flying assignments. However, if the captain
awarded the same flying assignment is over age sixty, the first
officer will only be awarded that trip assignment if he is under
age sixty. 137 Therefore, if the affected first officer is also over
age sixty, his seniority is abrogated and he may not receive the
day off that he desired, and was rightly entitled to, under a se-
niority-based system. The only protection the Act affords in this
type of situation is outlined in Section 44729(f). 38 Basically,
Congress is requiring all airlines affected by the Act to open ne-
gotiations on a very sensitive portion of airline agreements-
monthly scheduling.1 39 Considering the slow pace of negotia-
tions between unions and airlines, 40 it is unlikely that these im-
portant issues will be resolved any time in the near future.
137 See Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act of 2007, 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 44729(c) (1) (West Supp. 2008).
138 Id. § 44729(f).
Any amendment to a labor agreement or benefit plan of an air car-
tier that is required to conform with the requirements of this sec-
tion or a regulation issued to carry out this section, and is
applicable to pilots represented for collective bargaining, shall be
made by agreement of the air carrier and the designated bargain-
ing representative of the pilots of the air carrier.
Id.
139 See id.
4o See Terry Maxon, Airline Rejects Pilots' Request For Federal Mediator: American
Says Talks Would Go Faster Without a Federal Mediator, DAuLs MORNING NEws, Jan.
15, 2008, at ID (noting that the current round of collective bargaining began in
September of 2006 and little progress has been made).
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Admittedly, the above mentioned scenario is only an issue if
both the captain and first officer are over sixty years old. Since
the older than sixty first officer is reaping the benefit of the Act
in this scenario, he may not be particularly upset that he has
been bid-denied due to the crew-pairing restriction. But, since
it is the captains who receive the biggest windfall under this new
law, one solution to the problem illustrated above would be to
award the first officer his desired line and bid-deny the captain.
This notion is contrary to a seniority system. Thus, a more likely
solution is to remove the first officer from the affected trip, pay-
protect the affected pilot, and allow that that pilot to enjoy the
day(s) off he desired and would have been entitled to had there
been no crew-pairing restriction in the Act.
Another criticism of the Act is probably the most obvious.
The main argument of the opponents of the recently defeated
Age Sixty Rule was that the age limit was arbitrary.4 The Act
changes the retirement age from sixty to sixty-five. Age sixty-five
is just as arbitrary as age sixty. If safety is truly not an issue, then
there should be no mandatory age limit at all. Surely there are
octogenarians that can pass the medical tests and simulator eval-
uations required of commercial airline pilots. Interestingly, air
traffic controllers are required to retire at age fifty-five. 42 How-
ever, one study showed that controllers in their sixties per-
formed as well as or outperformed controllers in their thirties
on complex, real-world simulations. 4 ' The authors of the study
concluded that it may be time to revisit "the whole notion of
when we need to retire people, since their ability to do these
complex tasks resists decline."' 44 However, the same study did
show that the older controllers did not perform as well as the
younger ones during standard lab tests evaluating reaction
speed, attention, and memory.145 Reaction speed and attention
are critical during the high workload phases of flight, which in-
clude take-off and landing. Thus, I am not suggesting that there
should be no age limit for pilots. I am suggesting that Congress'
statement that age sixty was arbitrary but somehow age sixty-five
is not is fallacious. It is absolutely hypocritical of Congress to
claim that no solid reason exists to maintain the age sixty retire-
ment rule and then implement a law with a restriction that is
141 Barklow supra note 3, at 338; Phillips, supra note 28.
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just as arbitrary as the law they repealed. It would be refreshing
if Congress, just one time, would admit that the purpose behind
the rule change is not to protect "experienced" pilots, as all pi-
lots flying at major airlines are very experienced, but to redis-
tribute wealth from one group of affected pilots to another.
Furthermore, another section of the Act belies the statements
made by proponents of the Act that over age sixty pilots are just
as safe as those under age sixty.146 Section 44729(g) of the Act,
entitled Medical Standards and Records, indicates that the regu-
lators are not as certain that the over-sixty pilot group is every bit
as safe as the under-sixty group. 14 7 Currently, every airline pilot,
when exercising the privileges of his Airline Transport Pilot cer-
tificate, must maintain a first-class medical certificate.' 48 On
April 10, 2007, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
("NPRM") that would increase the duration of first-class medical
certificates for pilots younger than forty years of age. 149 The
NPRM would extend the period of validity of first-class medical
certificates from six months to twelve months. 5 ° Ostensibly, the
FAA proposed this rule because it has not reviewed medical du-
ration standards since 1996.151 The FAA stated that an exten-
sion of the medical certificate validity period would not decrease
safety because such individuals, those younger than forty years
of age, are much less likely to suffer medical incapacitation
(therefore acknowledging that the older crowd is more likely to
suffer a devastating, catastrophic medical event).52 In the
NPRM, the FAA acknowledged that it "has no experience ex-
tending the duration of first-class medical certificates beyond
the current 6-month limit."153 However, the FAA developed its
proposal based on a review of relevant medical literature, its
own aeromedical certification data, and accident data. 54 More-
over, "the FAA considered the long-standing International Civil
146 Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act of 2007, 49 U.S.C.A. § 4 4 7 29(g)
(West Supp. 2008).
147 Id.
148 14 C.F.R § 61.23(a)(1) (2008) "Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and
(c) of this section, a person... [m]ust hold a first-class medical certificate when
exercising the privileges of an airline transport pilot certificate." Id.
149 Modification of Certain Medical Standards and Procedures and Duration of








Aviation Authority (ICAO) standard requiring revalidation of
medical certification annually for airline transport and commer-
cial pilots in multi-crew settings.' 1 55 The twelve-month duration
period for first-class medical certificates became effective July
24, 2008.156
Notwithstanding the above, the Act requires over age sixty air-
line pilots to continue to receive first-class medical exams every
six months. 57 Additionally, despite the fact that the FAA's
NPRM tacitly admits that older pilots are more vulnerable to an
incapacitating episode, 5 1 the Act specifically prevents older pi-
lots from being subjected to more rigorous medical testing stan-
dards, at least in the absence of data requiring additional
testing, which can only be developed after the enactment date
of the Act. 159 If safety were truly not an issue, there would be no
need to require the older pilot corps to receive medical exams
more frequently than the younger pilot population. Also, the
Act specifically acknowledges that older pilots may require addi-
tional or more invasive testing to detect latent medical
problems, but the Act specifically prohibits such action for a pe-
riod of time, with devastating possibilities to unsuspecting, inno-
cent passengers in the interim. 6 ' Again, the traveling public
deserves better than to be treated as test passengers as the gov-
155 Id.
.56 14 C.F.R. § 61.23(d)(1) (2008).
157 Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act of 2007, 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 44729 (g) (2) (West Supp. 2008).
No person who has attained 60 years of age may serve as a pilot of
an air carrier engaged in covered operations unless the person has
a first-class medical certificate. Such a certificate shall expire on
the last day of the 6-month period following the date of examina-
tion shown on the certificate.
Id.
158 Modification of Certain Medical Standards and Procedures and Duration of
Certain Medical Certificates, 72 Fed. Reg. 18,092, 18,093 (Apr. 10, 2007).
159 49 U.S.C.A. § 44729(g)(1).
Except as provided by paragraph (2), a person serving as a pilot for
an air carrier engaged in covered operations shall not be subject to
different medical standards, or different, greater, or more frequent
medical examinations, on account of age unless the Secretary de-
termines (based on data received or studies published after the
date of enactment of this section) that different medical standards,
or different, greater, or more frequent medical examinations, are
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ernment tries to determine the wisdom of its new policy of al-
lowing older pilots to continue to fly in commercial operations.
The last provision of the Act which will be discussed is Section
44729(h), curiously entitled "Safety."'' It requires that the
over-sixty crowd be subjected to line evaluations every six
months in order that a pilot's performance be evaluated. 62 A
line check is a procedure whereby a company training pilot
(also known as a check airman) either flies as a co-pilot for the
captain being evaluated on a regularly scheduled trip, or the
check pilot occupies the observer's seat in the cockpit and only
monitors the performance of the crew during a regularly sched-
uled operation. This provision of the Act is ridiculous. The
point behind the Age Sixty Rule is that it worked. Everybody
still acknowledges that there is no precise way to measure when
a particular pilot is no longer capable of operating safely in the
demanding world of commercial aviation. Being subjected to a
line check every six months will not, in any way, contribute to
the determination that a pilot is on the precipice of an incapaci-
tating episode. This provision of the Act, though entitled Safety,
does absolutely nothing to contribute to the safety of the travel-
ing public. The only definite way to maintain the current level
of safety is to repeal the Act and reinstate the rule that we know
worked so well for close to fifty years.
161 Id. § 44729(h).
(1) Training.- Each air carrier engaged in covered operations shall
continue to use pilot training and qualification programs approved
by the Federal Aviation Administration, with specific emphasis on
initial and recurrent training and qualification of pilots who have
attained 60 years of age, to ensure continued acceptable levels of
pilot skill and judgment. (2) Line Evaluations.- Not later than 6
months after the date of enactment of this section, and every 6
months thereafter, an air carrier engaged in covered operations
shall evaluate the performance of each pilot of the air carrier who
has attained 60 years of age through a line check of such pilot.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, an air carrier shall not be
required to conduct for a 6-month period a line check under this
paragraph of a pilot serving as second-in-command if the pilot has
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III. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE ACT'S PASSAGE
The Act brings U.S. commercial pilot retirement rules in line
with the rules promulgated by the ICAO. 163 This section will
evaluate some possible reasons that, after close to fifty years of
failure, those opposed to the mandatory age sixty retirement
rule were finally able to achieve success.
A. OPEN SKIEs
Air transportation in the United States and around the world
is subject to many regulations and restrictions. As sovereigns,
nations enjoy exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which also in-
cludes jurisdiction over the air above its land. 164 This right has
long been recognized and has been codified in various interna-
tional agreements.165
The Paris Conference, in 1919, was the world's first multilat-
eral attempt to provide a framework for international avia-
tion.166 Though no comprehensive international regulatory
agreements were achieved, the Conference did draft the Con-
vention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, "under which
exclusive sovereignty of a state over the airspace above its terri-
tory was firmly established."'' 67 Under Article 16 of the Conven-
tion, "a state is authorized to favor its airlines 'in connection
with the carriage of persons and goods for hire between two
points in its territory.' "1 68
The next major international effort came at the Chicago In-
ternational Civil Aviation Conference ("Chicago Conference")
in 1944.169 During the conference, the United States proposed
multilateral recognition for five "freedoms of the air."1 7 ° The
freedoms included the rights of a country's civil aircraft:
163 On November 23, 2006, new ICAO retirement rules became effective,
which permit one pilot to be over age sixty (not to exceed sixty-five) if the other
pilot is younger than age sixty. See FAA's Age 60 Rule Homepage, http://www.
age60rule.com/#ICAO (last visited July 28, 2008).
164 Ved P. Nanda, Substantial Ownership and Control of International Airlines in the
United States, 50 Am. J. ComP. L. 357, 357 (2002).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 358.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 359; see also Convention Between the United States of America and
Other Governments Respecting International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61
Stat. 1180 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
170 Nanda, supra note 164, at 359.
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1) to fly over the territory of another without landing, provided
there is advance notice and approval; 2) to land in another
state's territory for non-commercial technical reasons, such as re-
fueling or maintenance; 3) to carry traffic from its country of
registry to another; 4) to carry traffic from another country to its
own country of registry; and 5) to carry traffic between two coun-
tries outside its own country of registry provided the flight
originates or terminates on its own.171
The attendees at the conference could not agree on a consensus
to accept the freedoms proposed by the United States, which
would have formed the core provisions of a multilateral treaty
governing international civil aviation. 72 However, the Conven-
tion did reaffirm that each nation is a sovereign entitled to con-
trol of the airspace above its land. 73 It was the purpose of the
Convention and the proposals of the United States at the con-
vention to foster the growth of the international civil aviation
industry.'74 Since the attendees failed to reach a multilateral in-




173 Chicago Convention, supra note 169. Chapter 1, Article 1 states: "The con-
tracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory." Id.
174 Id. The preamble states:
WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation
can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understand-
ing among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can
become a threat to general security; and
WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that
cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of
the world depends;
THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on
certain principles and arrangements in order that international
civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and
that international air transport services may be established on the
basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and
economically;
Have accordingly concluded this Convention to that end.
Id.
175 Nanda, supra note 164, at 363. Cabotage is defined as the "exclusive right
of a country to operate the air traffic within its territory." AMERICAN HERITAGE
DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004), available at http://diction-
ary.reference.com/browse/cabotage.
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The first U.S. statute to enforce cabotage restrictions against
foreign airlines was the Air Commerce Act of 1926.176 The U.S.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958177 reaffirmed the provisions of the
1926 act by banning cabotage privileges for foreign carriers. 78
It was the policy of the United States to strictly implement the
prohibition against foreign cabotage until the late 1980s. 179
As U.S. airlines were suffering financially in the early 1990s,
the U.S. policy position on cabotage began to change.8 0 The
government became less concerned with negotiating so-called
bilateral agreements with other nations and began pursuing a
new initiative known as "Open Skies."' 1 The Department of
Transportation ("DOT") stated, "the Open-Skies program repre-
sents a further progression along the path toward a truly open
environment for international aviation services, an environment
in which all the participants . . . will reap genuine and lasting
benefits."'82  The DOT listed the elements that it believed
should be a part of any Open Skies agreement. 8 ' For the
United States, the purpose behind these potential Open Skies
176 Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568; Nanda, supra note 164, at
363.
177 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
178 Id. § 1108(a). "The United States of America is hereby declared to possess
and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the
United States, including the airspace above all inland waters and the airspace
above those portions of the adjacent marginal high sea." Id. "Foreign aircraft,
which are not a part of the armed forces of a foreign nation, may be navigated in
the United States by airmen holding certificates or licenses issued or rendered
valid by the United States or by the nation in which the aircraft is registered if
such foreign nation grants a similar privilege with respect to aircraft of the
United States." Id. § 1108(b).
179 Nanda, supra note 164, at 364.
180 Id. at 373-74.
181 Id.
182 U.S. Dep't of Transp. Order No. 92-8-13, 1992 DOT Av. Lexis 568, at *3
(Aug. 5, 1992).
183 Id. at *4-*11. The elements include: 1) "Open entry on all routes;" 2)
"Unrestricted capacity and frequency on all routes;" 3) "Unrestricted route and
traffic rights, that is, the right to operate service between any point in the United
States and any point in the European country, including no restrictions as to
intermediate and beyond points; change of gauge, routing flexibility, coterminal-
ization, or the right to carry Fifth Freedom traffic;" 4) "Double-disapproval pric-
ing in Third and Fourth Freedom markets, and price leadership in .third country
markets to the extent that the Third and Fourth Freedom carriers in those mar-
kets have it;" 5) "Liberal charter arrangement (the least restrictive charter regula-
tions of the two governments would apply, regardless of the origin of the flight);"
6) "Liberal cargo regime;" 7) "Conversion and remittance agreement;" 8) "Open
code-sharing opportunities;" 9) "Self-handling provisions;" 10) "Procompetitive
provisions on commercial opportunities, user charges, fair competition and in-
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agreements was to ensure a strong and competitive domestic air-
line industry.'1 4 The U.S. government, in the early 1990s, felt
that the system of achieving bilateral agreements was "'no
longer sound' to meet the needs of the new global trade
environment."'185
It did not take long for the United States to succeed in its new
endeavor. The United States reached its first Open Skies agree-
ment with the Netherlands in 1992.186 That first agreement was
only the beginning. The United States has reached Open Skies
agreements with at least fifty-five countries.'87 "Open Skies
Agreements are usually a precursor to airline partnerships.' ' 88
The recent alignment of the U.S. commercial pilot retirement
age requirement with that of the ICAO standard is another step
which makes it easier for the United States to obtain Open Skies
agreements with more nations. It will also make it easier for the
United States to justify relaxing rules on foreign ownership and
control of U.S. airlines. As we move towards more seamless op-
erations and regulations between U.S. carriers and foreign carri-
ers, the United States inches closer and closer to its original goal
of a deregulated international civil aviation market.
B. PILOT SHORTAGE
Another possible reason for the sudden success in raising the
mandatory retirement age for commercial pilots is the fore-
casted shortage of qualified pilots available to U.S. airlines. 189
Currently, at least for legacy carriers, there is no shortage of
qualified pilots.'90 However, regional carriers are feeling some
pain. American Eagle airlines had to cancel some flights in
2007 because of a shortage of flight crews.' 9 ' In fact, to attract
enough pilots, American Eagle has lowered its minimum experi-
termodal rights;" 11) "Explicit commitment for nondiscriminatory operation of
and access for computer reservation systems." Id.
184 See Nanda, supra note 164, at 375.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. (noting that some of the nations the United States has reached agree-
ments with include twenty European countries and Sri Lanka, Morocco, and the
Philippines).
188 Id. at 376.
189 Scott McCartney, The Middle Seat: Airlines Lower Bar to Fill Pilot Ranks-Wors-
ening Shortages Force Some Small Carriers to Hire Younger, Less-Experienced lyers, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at D1.
190 Pilot List, supra note 94.
'9' McCartney, supra note 189, at D1.
606
FAIR TREATIMENT ACT
ence requirements for new hire pilot applicants. 19 2 The airline
has lowered its total flight hours requirement to 600 hours,
down from 800 hours, and the airline acknowledged that it will
interview applicants with as few as 500 total hours of flight expe-
rience. 9 3 American Eagle is not the only carrier lowering its
experience requirements. Trans States Airlines, a St. Louis-
based regional airline that operates flights on behalf of Ameri-
can, United, and US Airways, recently lowered its minimum
flight-time requirements to 500 hours, down from 1,500 hours
just a few years ago.'94 This is a particularly scary proposition
considering that these regional carriers operate jet aircraft that
are every bit as sophisticated as the jets operated by legacy
carriers.195
However, as a method of controlling the pilot shortage,
changing the mandatory retirement age is woefully inadequate.
At best it is a stop-gap measure that can only hope to stem the
shortfall for, at most, five more years. Additionally, it does not
address the root cause of the shortage. The root cause of the
shortage is pilot pay and benefits. Airline managements have,
over the past few years, successfully cut labor costs (pilot wages
and benefits) to the point that young people no longer view pi-
loting airplanes as a desirable career choice.'96 Starting salaries
at many of the regional carriers are as low as $24,000 per year. 97
Not many people want to pay over $54,000 to receive the train-
ing necessary to "land" a job that pays only $24,000 per year. 98




195 The American Eagle aircraft fleet includes the Embraer 145 family of air-
craft and the Bombardier CRJ 700 aircraft. American Airlines, American Eagle,
http://www.aa.com/aa/il8nForward.do?p=/footer/eagleOverview.jsp#Fleet%20
Information (last visited July 28, 2008). The ERJ 145 operates at a maximum
speed of Mach 0.78. Embraer Commercial Jets, ERJ 145 Performance Summary,
http://www.embraercommercialjets.com.br/english/content/erj/erj-145.asp?
tela=summary (last visited July 28, 2008). By way of comparison, the Boeing 737-
800 typically cruises at a speed of Mach 0.785. Boeing, Commercial Airplanes,
737 Family, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737family/pf/pL800tech.
html (last visited July 28, 2008).
196 See Torbenson, supra note 96, at 22A; Schroeder, supra note 97, at Al.
197 McCartney, supra note 189, at Dl.
'98 Airline Transport Professionals advertises its Fast Track Airline Career Pilot
Program at $57,495. ATP Flight School, Airline Training Programs, http://wv.
atpflightschool.com/airline-training-programs/index.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2008).
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ment should encourage the airlines to pay a decent wage to
their employees rather than concoct half-baked schemes that
only partially address systemic problems and will actually end up
hurting more people than the stop-gap measures help.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act is a poorly
constructed, ill-advised piece of legislation. It amounts to an
enormous financial windfall for a relatively small group of se-
nior airline pilots, while at the same time is financially devastat-
ing to the remaining pilot group. It will potentially cause five
years' worth of seat and pay stagnation. Therefore, a majority of
pilots will not be able to recoup the dollars lost because of this
legislation.
Every pilot currently working at a U.S. airline was hired under
the old, mandatory Age Sixty Rule. Every current captain bene-
fited, in terms of seniority and seat progression, from the old
rule. For the current group of senior pilots to claim that it is
unfair for them to have to retire at age sixty and let the pilots
junior to them progress through the ranks, just as they were able
to, is selfish and disingenuous. The only fair and equitable way
to change the retirement age would have been for Congress to
grandfather all active pilots under the old rule and apply the
new retirement rule to those pilots hired after the enactment
date of the statute.
Furthermore, the claim of some senior pilots that this law was
necessary because they needed to keep working is half-truth and
spin. The old rule did not prevent retired U.S airline pilots
from finding gainful employment as a pilot; it only prevented
them from continuing to fly for domestic commercial airlines.
The retirees were always free to continue their aviation careers
with charter companies, corporate flight departments, and for-
eign flag carriers, among other alternatives. In fact, some pilots
have found that starting a career with a foreign carrier is more
lucrative than the positions they held with their U.S. airline.'99
One former US Airways pilot stated that flying for Emirates Air-
lines allows him to spend more time at home now than he did
199 Susan Carey, Outbound Hight: With Jobs Scarce, U.S. Pilots Sign On at Foreign
Airlines-Global Travel Boom Yields Tempting Pay For Expats; Concerns About Safety-A
Captain's New Life in Dubai, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2006, at Al (noting that a former
US Airways pilot now flying for Emirates Airlines enjoys a total compensation
package that is superior to the package he enjoyed while employed with US
Airways).
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while flying for US Airways, and he has better housing and
health care, retirement, and vacation plans.200 Thus, for senior
pilots flying for domestic U.S. carriers to state that they need to
continue in their current positions in order to make up for any
lost retirement money does not state a true and accurate pic-
ture. Lucrative aviation careers do exist elsewhere. Arguably, in
most instances, one should not have to seek employment on the
other side of the world, but in this case, it is the fairest option.
Trying to remain in their current positions long after the time
they knew they would have to retire negatively impacts an enor-
mous group of pilots for the short-term benefit for a compara-
tively smaller group of pilots.
Finally, as a stop-gap measure to mitigate the effects of an im-
pending pilot shortage, the Act is woefully deficient. If there
truly is a coming shortage, then the Act, at best, delays the inevi-
table for five years. It does absolutely nothing to address the
root causes of a shortage and offers no real solutions to the
problem. The only true way to address any potential shortage is
to transform piloting airplanes in to an attractive career alterna-
tive for the youngsters of this nation. Airline pilot pay and bene-
fits have declined steadily since deregulation of the industry in
1978.201 Stemming the decline and actually reversing the trend
will go a long way toward relieving any potential pilot shortage
that looms on the horizon.
The Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act offers a solu-
tion to a problem that does not exist. It provides a windfall for
the senior most airline pilots of today at the expense of those
pilots junior to them on their airlines' respective seniority list. It
was passed under the guise of a desire to assist those pilots
whose pensions were terminated either consensually between
the airline and the union or in bankruptcy proceedings. How-
ever, the negatively affected pilots do have the opportunity to
continue lucrative careers elsewhere.
200 Id.
201 For example, a United Airlines B737 captain earned $100,000 per year in
1978. David C. Koch, Captain Icarus?, http://www.landings.com/_landings/sto-
ries/captainicarus.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). Adjusting for inflation, that
same pilot should be earning $282,000 per year in 2003 dollars. Id. However, in
actuality, the current United Airlines B737 captain earns $106,080 per year in
2008 dollars. See Airline Pilot Central, United, http://airlinepilotcentral.com/
airlines/legacy/united.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). As can be seen, United
Airlines B737 captains have essentially not received a raise in terms of real wages
since 1978.
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Another justification for the Act is that the old rule was arbi-
trary. However, as noted above, many provisions of the Act are
just as arbitrary as the old Age Sixty Rule itself. Plus, the Act will
do nothing to contribute to aviation safety. The point behind
the old rule is that it worked. It was simple to implement. It
treated all pilots equally. The Fair Treatment for Experienced
Pilots Act provides a glaring example of what happens when leg-
islators legislate concerning issues with which they have little
familiarity.
